

Model-Based Generation of Hazard-Driven Arguments and Formal Verification Evidence for Assurance Cases

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Abstract: Assurance cases (ACs) are an established practice for arguing confidence in critical system properties such as safety and security in high-risk industries. ACs use system artifacts to argue the aforementioned properties. Due to the iterative nature of system development, we need to update ACs to maintain assurance validity as a system evolves. For example, a changed design or an added hazard would result in re-evaluation of claims or a new claim to be verified. Thus, the generation and maintenance of ACs is a labour-intensive process. With the growing application of Model-based Engineering (MBE) in system development, it is beneficial to generate ACs from design models because this captures traceability, and enables automatic AC creation and update driven by model modification. Accordingly, the contribution of this paper is an automatic approach to AC generation and assembly from both unstructured design artifacts and UML-like design models within Eclipse. This approach also supports AC evidence generation by formal verification facilitated by automatically generated assertions. The realization of AC assembly and verification is supported by model query and model transformation. We apply our approach to an autonomous underwater robot with the RoboChart robotics modelling language.


1 INTRODUCTION


Assurance of properties, such as safety, security, reliability, is vital for the system operation, especially in high-risk industries such as automotive and health-care. The assurance is designed into the system and verified along the system development. An Assurance Case (AC) provides a way to argue, based on evidence, that certain properties are exhibited by the system. ACs are a useful tool for communication between different stakeholders and often required by safety standards, such as ISO26262 (ISO, 2011).


AC processes should proceed along system development. The process takes system development artifacts such as hazard analysis results, system architecture, verification methods and results, etc., as inputs to construct ACs. For example, hazard analysis and risk assessments give rise to a set of safety require-


ments which a system must exhibit. A safety AC is used to both justify these requirements, with reference to the hazards and other contextual data, and to show how these requirements are satisfied with reference to various artifacts created during development, such as models and codes. We can then use various kinds of evidence to substantiate our claims, e.g. that model checking demonstrates the correctness of the model.

Due to the iterative nature of system development, after creation, ACs need to be updated to maintain claim validity during system development. For instance, a design change will drive the re-verification and therefore the updated verification results may no longer support the claims; an added function introduces a new hazard, then a new claim shall be created and substantiated. Moreover, a change in a single design artifact raises the issue of artifact synchronisation due to the inner relationships among these artifacts. Specifically, a coherent AC requires us to keep a large number of artifacts synchronised. Every time one artifact changes, we potentially need to review and update all the others related. Therefore, maintaining ACs is labour-intensive and vulnerable to human

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error. And this is aggravated by the trends of Robotics and Autonomous Systems (RAS) whose operational boundary is usually uncertain at design time and requires higher frequency of updates than the traditional safety-critical systems. This leads to a desire for automatic management of traceability between AC elements and design artifacts which may further enable the automation of AC generation.

As the application of Model-based Engineering (MBE) grows rapidly, it becomes feasible and beneficial to generate model-based ACs from design artifacts automatically. As the basis of this automation, the automatic establishment of traceability mentioned above between ACs models and system artifacts can be realized by MBE techniques such as model query. Compared to ACs with no MBE support, e.g., pure graphical or textual ACs, the advantage of model-based ACs is the strong support of MBE techniques and tools to manage ACs in an efficient way. The application of MBE on AC process is a potential solution for automation with the benefit of workload reduction and error proofing. Much research effort (Denney and Pai, 2018; Hawkins et al., 2015; Gacek et al., 2014) has been put into this field. The survey work (Yan et al., 2021) shows that the application of MBE on AC process varies in terms of the MBE techniques exploited, the phases of process applied to, and the automation degree, etc.

However, the conclusions are drawn that there is not a full automation approach for the AC process. Specifically, (i) no solution is available to generate integrated AC arguments from system artifacts of different formats, such as spreadsheets, models, etc. The available approaches cover either the AC generation from design models, or from structured design artifacts excluding design models and the unstructured design artifacts. The unstructured data in this paper refers to the data which is not backed by a meta-model. Also, the AC generation from design models is limited to specific modelling notations and development environments; (ii) formal verification is widely used in AC evidence generation, but the automation of the whole AC process is hindered by the formal assertion generation which usually is a manual process and requires expertise. This results in a gap in the automation loop; (iii) the AC metamodelling designed in different work vary and are mainly based on Goal Structuring Notation (GSN) (OMG, 2021). Extra effort is needed for unification when exploiting these different methods in one application. Meanwhile, the unified AC metamodel ‘Structured Assurance Case Meta-Model’ (SACM) (OMG, 2020) is both standardised and flexible and can be the solution for unification. In particular, it allows much more depth in

describing artifact links and therefore supports more possibilities for artifacts synchronisation.

Our paper contributes a model-based approach (Fig.1) that assembles and verifies the SACM-compliant AC models in an automatic way. We design an AC pattern for the property to be argued. Then, we convert the unstructured system artifacts to EMF models, create AC model structure by instantiating an AC pattern with EMF models, and also by querying design models. These AC models are assembled as an integrated module. Further, for the evidence of claims that can be generated by formal verification, we generate automatically the assertions using MBE techniques for model checking. The evidence models will be created from the verification results and integrated into the AC module. An example for the above process can be that (i) a safety requirement ‘Operator can obtain the system control when required.’ in a hazard table spreadsheet is converted to an EMF model, (ii) a claim ‘The safety requirement {Operator can obtain the system control when required.} shall be implemented.’ is created by instantiating AC pattern with the EMF model of this safety requirement, (iii) a formal assertion ‘System_S::State_Operator_Control is reachable in System_S.’ is derived from the claim, then checked with a formal verification tool, (iv) the evidence ‘The formal verification result is true.’ is created by AC pattern instantiation with the verification results, and is integrated into the AC module.

Different verification techniques can be involved in the provision of evidence to AC claims. This work primarily addresses the automated formal verification. Other possible techniques for automation will be addressed in future work. We have applied our approach to an autonomous underwater vehicle to evaluate the effectiveness.




Fig. 1: Automating Assembly and Verification of ACs.

The main contributions of our paper are:

1. An approach for generating and assembling SACM-compliant AC models from both UML-like models and unstructured artefacts.
2. A solution for automatic generation of AC evidence by formal verification. The MBE tech-

niques are explored to automate the generation of formal assertions to reduce the need of Formal Methods (FM) expertise.

3. A case study has been carried out as an example using RoboChart (Miyazawa et al., 2019).

We organize the paper as follows. §2 provides the required background on AC and MBE. §3 details the approach step by step. §4 shows the case study on an autonomous underwater vehicle. §5 discusses related work, and we conclude in §6.

2 PRELIMINARIES

2.1 Assurance Case Notations

ACs can be in various formats e.g., text, graphics, and machine-readable models. One of the popular forms is graphical notations (e.g., GSN and Claims-Arguments-Evidence (CAE) (Adelard, 2017)) that document AC elements with various shapes and represent their relationships in a structured way. The graphical notations facilitate the system stakeholders' understanding of the information for arguing the system properties. GSN is developed by (Kelly and McDermid, 1997). It comprises 6 principal elements, goal, context, justification, assumption, strategy, and solution, and 2 types of linkages between elements, SupportedBy and InContextOf. It is the dominant graphic notation used in engineering practice and academy.

However, GSN is not originally supported by metamodels. Therefore, many pieces of work have proposed AC metamodels for GSN (Denney and Pai, 2018; Hawkins et al., 2015). Meanwhile, OMG released SACM for the purpose of improving standardisation and interoperability. Compared with the other proposed AC metamodels, SACM provides unique features, such as, fine-grained modularity, controlled terminology, and traceability from argument to evidence artifacts (Wei et al., 2019).

SACM supports creation of machine-readable AC models that facilitate the exchange of information between stakeholders. SACM also supports and unifies GSN and CAE. SACM metamodel has five components. A Base package defines the fundamental elements of SACM, such as element names and descriptions. An Argumentation package consists of claims, evidence citations, and inferential links among them. The Artifact package captures the concepts used in providing evidence for the arguments made for system properties, and represents the evidence and context files referenced. The Terminology package captures the concepts used in expressing the claims regarding system properties, such as expressions, and

the argumentation components. An AssuranceCase package contains Argumentation packages, Terminology packages and Artifact packages.

Basically, an argumentation package functions the same as a GSN module. Its metamodel is shown in Fig.2. The ArgumentAsset groups the argument elements including Claims, ArtifactReferences, ArgumentReasoning and AssertedRelationships (Foster et al., 2021). ArtifactReference is the reference to the artifact to define evidence. ArgumentReasoning is the strategy to inference the lower-level claims. AssertedRelationships are the relationships between different assets. Specifically, the AssertedInference represents the inference links between the lower-level claims which are the source of the link to the higher-level claims which are the target. AssertedContext builds links from an artifact that defines context to claims. AssertedEvidence builds links from evidence to claims that the evidence supports. For example, a top-level claim 'the system operates safely.' is supported by lower-level claims 'the control unit meets safety requirements' and 'the operators follow the operation manual' through an AssertedInference; and the 1st lower-level claim is supported by the evidence 'control unit test report' and 'formal verification results' through an assertedInference.

2.2 Assurance Case Processes

A common AC process includes four main steps: AC pattern design, instantiable data identification, pattern instantiation, and evidence generation.

AC patterns are introduced by (Kelly and McDermid, 1997). The patterns capture repeatedly used structures of successful arguments in an abstract way (Denney and Pai, 2013). Many pieces of work have proposed the patterns for various applications, such as the ones in (Denney and Pai, 2013; Prokhorova et al., 2015). Depending on the properties to be argued, and the types of systems, patterns are different.

The instantiable data is the system artifacts needed as AC inputs, and should be organized in the formats that the instantiating tool can read. We need to identify the artifacts required for AC, then to identify the relationships between system artifacts and AC elements in the pattern, and the inner relationships among these artifacts themselves. With the pattern and the instantiable data as inputs, the instantiation is to replace the AC place holder elements in the pattern with the concrete values from the instantiable data.

After the instantiation, the evidence for the claim shall be generated by verification, and so a further instantiation step is required using the verification results. Following this, the AC module may be ready

build the detailed and complete approach in this paper. We use RoboChart and its development environment RoboTool to illustrate the approach in this section. The input of the AC process, i.e., the instantiable system artefacts and the process output AC modules are all processed as EMF models.

The approach includes three main activities (Fig. 3). The first step is to process the unstructured artefacts (e.g., hazard analysis results) into the structured EMF models using Algorithm 1 and further to generate SACM AC models from EMF models using Algorithm 2. This is discussed in §3.1. §3.2 is to generate AC models directly from system design models by model query using Algorithm 3, then to assembly with the output of §3.1 to obtain an integrated AC model. In §3.3, we introduce the approach for automatic formal verification of AC claims obtained in §3.2. We use Algorithm 4 to automatically generate formal assertions from AC claims. In our approach, the terms used are mainly of safety property, but the approach is applicable for different properties with adjusting the input data and AC patterns.

3.1 AC generation from unstructured artifacts

System development processes produce different types of artifacts (e.g., specifications, design, architecture, verification and validation reports) in various formats such as text, models, and spreadsheets. Most of these artifacts are unstructured and do not support MBE. The unstructured data in this paper refers to the data which is not backed by a metamodel. To generate model-based ACs, we first convert all these unstructured AC inputs to a unified and structured format (i.e., EMF models) using Ecore metamodels. For each type of artifact, we design a corresponding metamodel and the data structuring algorithm (Algorithm 1 in Fig.3) thereof. All the metamodels shall be compliant with the same metamodeling language for the unification purpose. By implementing the algorithm, the structure is introduced into the data based on the metamodel.

Then, the AC pattern shall be defined according to the system nature and property to be argued, and is embedded into the pattern instantiation rules (Algorithm 2 in Fig.3). The output of the process is a set of SACM-compliant AC models.

In the paper, we illustrate the approach using hazard analysis artifact as an example. For safety properties, the results of hazard analysis are stored in a hazard table, usually in a form of a spreadsheet. The spreadsheet is regarded as an unstructured format in our work as it has no metamodel though it can be con-

sidered as ‘structured’ in other context. Abstracting from (Agrawal et al., 2019; Denney and Pai, 2018), we propose a generalized Ecore metamodel¹ for the hazard table. We present Algorithm 1 ‘Data structuring - Hazard table’ in the paper. Its purpose is to scan each column row by row in the spreadsheet, create and instantiate a class for each element, also establish the traceability between elements in the same row and between elements of different rows.

Algorithm 1: Data structuring-Hazard table

```

1 forall r in HazardTable.rows do
2   if r.HazardID.isDefined then
3     h ← r.createH()
4     ht.h ← ht.h ∪ {h}
5     if r.CauseID.isDefined then
6       c ← r.createC()
7       h.c ← h.c ∪ {c}
8       if r.SRID.isDefined then
9         sr ← r.createSR()
10        c.sr ← c.sr ∪ {sr}
11        if r.VerificationID.isDefined then
12          vr ← r.createVR()
13          sr.vr ← sr.vr ∪ {vr}
14          vre ← r.createEv()
15          vr.ev ← vre
16        if r.ValidationID.isDefined then
17          Repeat Line 12-15 replacing
18            ‘vr’ with ‘va’
19      else
20        if r.CauseID.isDefined then
21          Repeat Line 6-17
22        else
23          if r.SRID.isDefined then
24            Repeat Line 9-17
25          else
26            Repeat Line 12-17

```

In the hazard table, there are seven elements for each row including hazard, cause, safety requirement, verification, validation, verification evidence, and validation evidence. The algorithm creates models *h*, *c*, *sr*, *vr*, *va*, *vre*, *vae* correspondingly for all the elements, and builds traceability among them. Taking the first element ‘hazard’ as an example, ‘HazardID’ (Line 2) is a header in the spreadsheet. We create a hazard model *h* (Line 3) if the value of ‘HazardID’ is given, and add it to the set of table’s hazard *ht.h* (Line 4). Thus, traceability is established between the hazard table model *ht* and *h*. Then, we move to the second element ‘CauseID’ in the spreadsheet to create model ‘*c*’ for the cause, and build traceability between hazards and causes through adding *c* to the set of hazard’s causes *h.c*. Also, a structure that is composed of

¹<https://github.com/uoy-fangyan/modelsward-ac-generation.git>.




Fig. 3: AC assembly and verification framework.

hazards and causes is introduced into the model. The algorithm continues to the last element in the table. With this algorithm, we can automatically structure the hazard table whenever the table is updated.

Next, the AC pattern is designed for the hazard table, the AC pattern is designed for the hazard table (Fig.4). It is represented in GSN for readability. We constrain the AC pattern to a specific structure as it makes AC generation more amenable to automation. The structure follows the hierarchy of the hazard table. Four principles are implemented to build the pattern as follows,

1. The elements of hazard, cause, safety requirement, verification, validation are the instantiation inputs for AC claims.
2. The claims for causes and safety requirements can be decomposed recursively. For the sake of readability, Algorithm 2 presented here is constrained to one layer of cause and safety requirement.
3. The results of verification and validation are instantiation inputs for AC evidence.
4. The strategy is built between every two adjacent levels of claims. There is no strategy between claims and evidence. The content of strategy is determined by the claims contents of two levels. For example, the strategy to decompose a claim for a hazard to a set of claims for the causes is 'Argument over identified hazard causes'.

The pattern represents the AC structure, and the mapping between elements of the hazard table and instantiable elements in AC. We design Algorithm 2 to embed AC pattern and instantiation rules, and to comply with SACM.

In Algorithm 2 'Pattern Instantiation - HT' for generating AC from hazard table, 'Str' represents strategy, 'Inf' represents inference which is the links between claims, 'Inf.src' represents the set of source




Fig. 4: AC pattern in GSN notation.

claims of the link, 'Inf.tgt' represents the target claim of the link, 'Ae' represents AssertedEvidence, i.e., the link from evidence to claim, 'Ev' represents evidence. The algorithm starts from the first instantiable element {Hazard} in AC pattern (Fig.4). Taking haz-

ard model h from Algorithm 1 as an input, a claim model $hClaim$ is created and instantiated (line 2). If this hazard contains any causes, an inference link $hInf$ between hazard and causes is built (line 4), as well as the strategy $hStr$ (line 5). $hClaim$ is also identified as the inference's target (line 6). Since lower-level claims have not been created, the source claims of the inference are not identified at this stage. Then, for each cause of this hazard, a claim $cClaim$ is defined and is identified as the source of $hInf$ (line 9). Thereafter, the algorithm proceeds following the same pattern for the rest of the elements in AC pattern.

Algorithm 2: Pattern Instantiation- HT

```

1 forall h in ht.model do
2   hClaim ← h.createClaim
3   if ¬EMPTY(h.c) then
4     hInf ← hClaim.createInf
5     hStr ← hClaim.createStr
6     hInf.tgt ← hClaim
7     forall c ∈ h.c do
8       cClaim ← c.createClaim
9       hInf.src ← hInf.src ∪ {cClaim}
10      if ¬EMPTY(c.sr) then
11        Repeat Line 4-9 replacing 'c', 'h'
12        with 'sr', 'c'
13        if ¬EMPTY(sr.vr) then
14          Repeat Line 4-9 replacing
15          'c', 'h' with 'vr', 'sr'
16          if ¬EMPTY(vr.vre) then
17            vrAe ← vr.createAE
18            vrAe.tgt ← vrClaim
19            forall vre ∈ vr.vre do
20              vrEv ←
21              vr.createEv
22              vrAe.src ←
23              vrAe.src ∪ {vrEv}
24          if ¬EMPTY(sr.va) then
25            Repeat line 13-19 replacing
26            'vr' with 'va'

```

3.2 AC generation from design models and assembly

Besides the pattern instantiation method in §3.1, here we propose to generate AC structure directly from design models without predefined AC patterns.

The design models are the models written in certain system modelling languages (e.g., AADL, SysML, RoboChart) which are supported by their metamodels. According to the structure and elements in the system modelling metamodel (e.g., states, transitions, and actions in RoboChart), we first define the design model related claims, and then design the query rules for generating these claims and for obtaining the evidence to the claims. The query rules are implemented in Algorithm 3 of Fig.3.

To illustrate the approach, we consider a scenario with the claim and evidence as follows,

Claim: Every state meeting Condition 1 shall have a transition meeting Condition 2.

Evidence: A transition meeting Condition 2 exists for each state.

If we choose to generate AC manually, a typical way is to review the design models to manually identify the states that satisfy Condition 1 and all the transitions for each of these states that meet Condition 2. The states and the transitions will be used as input for creating safety requirements and their verification evidence respectively. The AC fragment then can be generated by pattern instantiation following §3.1. However, the AC arguments need to be updated manually when system design changes, e.g., states have been added or deleted.

To avoid this manual process, we apply model querying (Gacek et al., 2014) in our approach. For the scenario above, Algorithm 3 'Design model query-st/tr' is designed. The algorithm searches all the states meeting condition 'Cond1', and create a claim for each of these states. To obtain the evidence to claims, all transitions of each state are checked to identify the one meeting condition 'Cond2' (line 6); and the evidence and an inference link to the claim are created. This algorithm addresses the scenario that claims are built on the constraints of states and their transitions. There will be other types of claims involving other elements in modelling languages. After query rules are designed, they can be stored and revoked from the library for reuse. To assemble the AC fragments generated with Algorithm 2 and with Algorithm 3, we create an identifier 'Query' to be inserted in the hazard table, recognize this identifier in Algorithm 3 (line 1), and integrate the two fragments as a complete module (line 2 and 5).

Algorithm 3: Design model query-st/tr

```

1 forall AC.inf ∈ {i | i.source = "Query"} do
2   inf.source.clear
3   forall System.state ∈ {s | s |= Cond1} do
4     state.createClaim&AE
5     inf.Source ← inf.Source ∪ {stateClaim}
6     forall
7       System.transition ∈ {tr | tr |= Cond2}
8       do
9         tr.createEvidence
10        state.AE.Target ← stateClaim
11        State.AE.Source ←
12        State.AE.Source ∪ {trEvidence}

```

The approach builds automatically traceability between design models and AC models, thus can avoid the manual update of system models in the ACs and

further reduce the errors. Here we assumed the system modelling language has the elements of the state machine, state, and transitions for algorithm buildup. But the idea of AC generation by model query is not limited to a certain type of language, and can be applied to architectural languages in general.

3.3 Formal verification of claims

In §3.2, the evidence can be generated automatically using the results of model querying. In this section, we introduce an automatic approach to generate evidence by verifying claims using formal verification within RoboTool (part 3 of Fig.3). We exploit model checking in this paper.

To perform the model checking of system property, we need the formalized system models and the formal assertions of the property. Both the processes of system model formalization and assertion generation are typically manual processes and require FM expertise. This results in two gaps in the automation loop. To address the gap of formalization of system models, we make use of one of the RoboChart features. RoboChart can be converted into formal CSP models automatically within RoboTool. And this CSP model can be checked by FDR. Thus, we take the automatically converted CSP models as the formal models for formal verification. Therefore, We mainly address the second gap in this paper.

The FDR assertions are written in machine-readable CSP (CSPM). Take the property of state reachability, for example, the assertion may be as follows,

```
assert not STOP [T= let
id_ = 0
withinSystem::VS.O_(id_) | \
{|State_machine :: enteredV.State_machine ::
SID_State_machine_State|}
```

With the support of RoboChart assertion language, the above assertion will be more concise and easy to be created as follow,

```
assertion A1_reachable : State_machine::State is
reachable in System.
```

From this example, we conclude it is feasible to automate the assertion generation from RoboChart models by making use of RoboChart assertion language. Therefore, to address the gap of manual generation of formal assertions, we propose a automatic solution to generate RoboChart DSL assertion.

The formal evidence generation process summarized in part 3 of Fig.3 is specified with RoboTool environment as shown in Fig.5. We classify the AC claims that can be formally verified, design the FDR assertion templates for each class and perform model-to-text transformation according to Algorithm 4 in




Fig. 5: Evidence generation by FDR model checking.

Fig.3. Note that since the assertions are generated from AC claims, we require these AC claims and the hazard table for deriving these claims to be written with predefined terms and templates. Thus, the key information can be extracted by Algorithm 4 automatically. Though it requires a bit more effort to create the constrained hazard table, it indeed lowers the workload and the necessity of FM expertise in terms of assertion generation and reduces the whole workload, especially for the complex assertions. The generated assertions then are automatically called by FDR to output the checking results which will be further transformed to AC evidence models. These evidence models shall be integrated into the AC module generated according to §3.1.

Algorithm 4 ‘Assertion generation - reachability’ is designed for the state reachability assertion. The algorithm identifies all the claims that require state reachability checking (line 2), then read the state to be checked from the claim model (line 2), and instantiate the assertion pattern for reachability class (line 3).

Algorithm 4: Assertion generation - reachability

```

1 n ← 1
2 forall AC.assertedEvidence ∈
   {ae|ae.tgt.startsWith(“Validation of reachability”)}
   do
3   createAssertion(Assertion n: l.getStmName ::
   l.getStateName is reachable in
   l.getStmName)
4   n ← n + 1
```

4 IMPLEMENTATION AND CASE STUDY

We implemented all the algorithms of §3, and carried out a case study of an Autonomous Underwater Vehicle (AUV) for approach evaluation. The codes and the use case can be accessed online².

²<https://github.com/uoy-fangyan/modelsward-ac-generation.git>

4.1 System description and hazard analysis

We illustrate our approach using the AUV introduced in (Foster et al., 2020). The AUV can be operated by human or by system automatically. The mission of the system is the underwater maintenance and intervention tasks. The main hazard of the system is the collision of AUV with different types of subsea system components and infrastructure, which can be caused by operator or AUV system. The local path planning exploits machine learning techniques, but the safety monitoring component Last Response Engine (LRE) is developed without artificial intelligence in order to assure that the safety component can be thoroughly verified. Our AC is built for this LRE.

Fig. 6 shows the RoboChart state machine model of LRE. The function of LRE is to switch the operation modeS of the system based on the safety condition of operation. There are four modes: (i) Operator Control Mode (OCM), a manual mode, (ii) Main Operating Mode (MOM), the automatic mode in safe condition, (iii) High Caution Mode (HCM),the automatic mode used when the collision risk is to be lowered by reducing speed, (iv) Collision Avoidance Mode (CAM), the emergency automatic mode used when the collision risk is too high and need to be reduced by maneuver. Various transitions model the moving of one mode to another. For example, the LRE can move from MOM to HCM when the horizontal velocity is greater than or equal to 0.1, and the horizontal distance to a static obstacle is less then a given constant. Moreover, the operator can command the LRE to switch modes using the events reqOCM/MOM/HCM. Detailed description of the system operation can be referred in (Foster et al., 2020).

For this system, we use one hazard of LRE component as an example to show the algorithm implementation. The process of the hazard analysis is not the focus of our approach, and we use hazard table as the input of AC generation. As shown in the excerpt of hazard table (Fig.7), for the safety requirement {SR: Operator shall obtain the control from any state in which the operator is not in control when requesting.}, the sub-level safety requirement shall be instantiated by the states concrete state names as ‘MOM’, ‘HCM’, and ‘CAM’ according to Fig. 6. We discuss the details in the rest of this section.

4.2 AC generation and verification

We first transform the hazard table spreadsheet into EMF models (Fig.8) using Algorithm 1 with Epsilon Object Language (EOL). There is one to one mapping

between elements of Fig.7 and of Fig.8.

Secondly, we implement the transformation from EMF hazard table to SACM AC according to Algorithm 2 with Epsilon Transformation Language (ETL). A fragment of output including claims for ‘SubCause’ and ‘SR’ is shown in line 36 and 50 of Fig. 9 in the form of XML. The complete output is available online. Thirdly, we generate the claims for sub-level safety requirements *SubSR* in Fig.7 and their evidence by querying RoboChart models according to Algorithm 3. An AC fragment is automatically generated as follows,

Claim 1: {State MOM} shall have a transition whose trigger is reqOCM and target is OCM.

Inference Strategy 1: Argument over V&V methods of {Claim 1}.

Claim 1.1: {Claim 1} is verified by model query.

Evidence 1.1: {Tr t2} exists for {State MOM}.

Claim 2: {State HCM} shall have a transition whose trigger is reqOCM and target is OCM.

Inference Strategy 2: Argument over V&V methods of {Claim 2}.

Claim 2.1: {Claim 2} is verified by model query.

Evidence 2.1: {Tr t3} exists for {State HCM}.

Claim 3: {State CAM} shall have a transition whose trigger is reqOCM and target is OCM.

Inference Strategy 3: Argument over V&V methods of {Claim 3}.

Claim 3.1: {Claim 3} is verified by model query.

Evidence 3.1: {Tr t17} exists for {State CAM}.

Each of these claims uses a named transition as evidence that ‘reqOCM’ is always possible. If the state machine is later changed, for example, an extra state is added, the process would require this new state to fulfill this requirement.

Fourthly, there is the claim requiring that the reachability of state OCM shall be checked by FDR (Fig.7). The DSL assertion template for reachability is designed in EGL, and is transformed into an assertion file using EGL Co-Ordination Language (EGX). The generated assertion is as follows,

Assertion: LRE_Beh::OCM is reachable in LRE_Beh.

Here, the state name ‘OCM’ is obtained automatically from the AC claim models, and the state machine name ‘LRE_Beh’ from RoboChart models.

In this section, we illustrate our approach of §3 using an excerpt of the LRE use case. The complete implementation and the case study are available online. The execution of formal assertions in FDR is currently manual and the automation is under development. The ability to derive AC models from system models enables the co-evolution of system design and ACs.




Fig. 6: RoboChart model of LRE (Foster et al., 2020).

Hazard	Cause	SubCause	SR	SubSR	Verification	Verification result	Validation	Validation result
AUV collision with obstacle	AUV system failure leads to AUV collision with obstacle.	Operator can not obtain the control from the state in which the operator is not in control when requesting.	Operator shall obtain the control from any operational state in which the operator is not in control when requesting.	Query: each state except OCM should have a outgoing transition whose trigger is reqOCM, and target is OCM.	Model query	The named transition returned by querying if exists.	Validation of reachability: State {OCM}	FDR model checking results

Fig. 7: Excerpt of LRE hazard table spreadsheet.

5 RELATED WORK

(Denney and Pai, 2018) provide a solution and tool for automatic generation of a complete set of ACs using the pattern instantiation method. The tool also provides functions of AC query and review which are convenient for AC management. But the system artifacts are not necessarily to be structured models thus the work does not cover AC generation from system models nor the ACs integration of different sources.

(Hawkins et al., 2015) use the concept of pattern instantiation for generating GSN-based ACs. They use model weaving (Del Fabro et al., 2006) to facilitate the relationship building at metamodel level between instantiable artifacts and AC elements. The premise of the work is that both the instantiable data and the AC pattern are structured models. The advantage of the work is that instantiable models can be extracted automatically. Our approach is inspired by this work, and we expand the instantiable data from only system design models to cover also the unstructured artifacts. We also provide the solution for assembly.

(Gacek et al., 2014) presents a method of AC generation by AADL model querying. The query environment is integrated with the Open Source AADL Tool Environment (OSATE). The claim is formalized and verified by querying system models. The coupling of ACs with system design ensures the consistency between the ACs and system models when design changes. We refer to the model query concept in

our Algorithm 3. Different from this work, our model query is not constrained to a specific development environment. This independence allows a wider scope of applicability.

(Šljivo et al., 2020) proposes to generate AC from system design pattern using MBE. This is different from our method of generating AC directly from system models. (Gallina and Nyberg, 2017) exploits model query technique and AC patterns to generate AC from system artifacts that comply with OSLC (Open Services for Lifecycle Collaboration) (Oasis, 2021) standard. The method does not address the unstructured artifacts nor system design models. Our approach complements their work.

For formal verification of AC claims, (Diskin et al., 2018) and (Gleirscher et al., 2019) both generate assertions by formalizing claims. The advantage is the rigorous mathematical refinement checking on the inference by formal verification. However, the work does not address the automation of formal verification of AC claims. (Cârlan et al., 2020) tackles the consistency checking between system artifacts and AC elements, and use model checking as one of the claim verification methods. The automation of assertion generation is not addressed.

Our approach provides an automatic solution covering AC generation and verification, and has extended the existing work, closed the gaps of AC assembly and automatic formal verification. To the

- ▼ ◆ Hazard Log
 - ▼ ◆ Hazardous Situation AUV collides with obstacles
 - ▼ ◆ Cause AUV system failure leads to AUV collision with obstacle
 - ▼ ◆ Cause operator can not obtain the control from the state in which the operator is not in control when requesting
 - ▼ ◆ Control Measure Operator shall obtain the control from any operational state in which the operator is not in control when requesting.
 - ▼ ◆ Control Measure Query: each state (RoboChart State) except OCM should have a outgoing transition whose trigger is reqOCM, and target is OCM
 - > ◆ Verification Model query: if the required transition exists.
 - > ◆ Validation Validation of reachability : state {OCM}

Fig. 8: Excerpt EMF models of hazard table.

```

36     <value lang="English" content="Cause C1-1.1 {operator can not obtain
the control from the state in which the operator is not in control when
requesting } shall be avoided."/>
37   </content>
38 </description>
39 </argumentation_:Claim>
40 <argumentation_:AssertedInference source="/10" target="/7"
reasoning="/9"/>
41 <argumentation_:ArgumentReasoning>
42   <content>
43     <value lang="English" content="Strategy: Argue over identified control
measures."/>
44   </content>
45 </argumentation_:ArgumentReasoning>
46 <argumentation_:Claim>
47   <name lang="English" content="Claim for M1-1.1-1"/>
48   <description>
49     <content>
50     <value lang="English" content="Safety measure M1-1.1-1 {Operator
shall obtain the control from any operational state in which the operator is
not in control when requesting. } shall be implemented."/>

```

Fig. 9: AC model fragment generated from hazard table.

best of our knowledge, our approach of model-based AC generation, assembly and formal verification is the first one that can generate and assemble SACM-compliant AC from both structured and unstructured system artifacts, and can formally verify AC claims by automatic generation of formal assertions.

6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

ACs evolve along the system development lifecycle. The automation of the AC process based on MBE reduces the workload and chances of errors. The standardized metamodel SACM provides a foundation for model-based AC generation. We have developed an approach for model-based assembly and formal verification of ACs based on EMF. The approach provides an automatic solution that is compliant with SACM and is applicable to system models of UML-like languages. We apply our approach to a robotic system simply as an illustrative example. However, our techniques are general enough to be applied to a wide range of systems. Hazard analysis is a generally applied technique. So is the CSP process algebra, which has been applied to many kinds of systems.

For AC generation, we will develop more meta-models for different system artifacts and the transformation rules thereof. For AC generation by querying design models, the method is not applicable to all types of claims. But we will expand the types of claims to obtain good coverage. Also, our approach of formal verification is currently supported by FDR model checker. Further, we will explore other FM

tools to expand the formal verification methods on other model checkers for different properties, such as probabilistic property, and on theorem provers to improve the applicability of our approach.

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